SOME THOUGHTS ON A NEW COALITION OF ETHIOPIAN OPPOSITION

GROUPS

by

Theodore M. Vestal

Professor of Political Science

Oklahoma State University

Presented in Ethiopian Email Distribution Network Conference

"The Need for New Governance in Ethiopia," 27 August-10 September 2001

Many Ethiopians in the diaspora, with good reason, are not optimistic about the help of the United States in bringing democracy to Ethiopia. Most believe that they are compelled to deal with their own problems rather than relying on external forces. The EEDN Conference on New Governance in Ethiopia is to be especially commended for providing a forum to discuss means of uniting political opposition activities and articulating a vision of a post-EPRDF Ethiopia.

Truth is tyranny's ultimate vulnerability. The Woyane may be a particularly hard case,

but, in the end, they will not be immune. On the positive side, many intelligent and articulate Ethiopians, frustrated in missing the chance to found a new democratic government and civic society in 1991, want to be prepared when the next opportunity arises. Most are committed to a united and democratic Ethiopia that is governed by the rule of law and that does not institutionalize the dominance of one ethnic group over any other. The task at hand is to marshal human and other resources so that freedom-loving Ethiopians everywhere, regardless of their ethnic origin, language, religion, or political preference "may all be one."

To promote harmony between opposition groups, the EEDN must create an umbrella group that offers opposition organizations flexibility to follow different approaches to express their aspirations. Such an umbrella group must be grounded in sound theory. Thus, it is important for the EEDN to develop a meaningful declaration of principles. For a start, there should be agreement that 1) government should exist to provide economic security for the people and to put an end to the suffering caused by poverty, disease, and famine; 2) a united and democratic Ethiopia should be governed by representatives of the people chosen in fair multiparty elections; 3) the government should function under prospective, publicly articulated rules that protect the citizen's human rights and do not institutionalize the dominance of one ethnic group over another; 4) the government of the EPRDF has not performed these tasks according to the will of the Ethiopian people; and 5) therefore a united opposition should persevere in a sustained act of public relations to keep the image of a deserving, suffering, non-democratic Ethiopia so well illumined that public opinion in the United States and other donor nations, representing respect for the values of democracy and human rights, will be brought to bear on changing the conditions of governance in the FDRE.

To provide a compelling image of Ethiopia's future, there is immediate need for a popular coalition organized in such a way that different ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups can work together. Such a coalition must reflect and serve the diverse purposes of all groups and interests within it. The major opposition forces must be willing to compromise and to agree upon an institutional structure that provides a reasonable guarantee that their interests will not be affected in a highly adverse manner in the course of democratic competition. Agreements about institutions must be achieved, even though the opposition groups involved have conflicting interests and visions, because institutions shape the opportunities of realizing specific interests and the groups involved understand that institutions have this effect. In doing this, the coalition will have to modify the signature industry of Ethiopia: obstreperousness. The factories that formerly produced nothing but arguments and negativity among the opposition must be converted to turning out substantive positive products.

With the basic agreement reached, opposition groups should start talking about issues that bind rather than fracture. The parties involved must evince a new spirit of leadership and a new culture learned in the ways of democracy. This will be a major accomplishment for the leaders of opposition groups, who must hold their followers' loyalty but not reproduce their uncompromising attitudes in negotiating with others.

The leaders should agree that the procedures of democracy allow for divergent outcomes and that they locate commonalties on the way to difference. In doing this, participants will show a generosity of spirit to open themselves to such frank and serious discussions. The opposition parties will have to demonstrate a commitment to working for a state of affairs where most agree on fundamentals where their lives impinge on one another, and are prepared to exercise forbearance and adopt democratic means of resolving disputes where they do not agree. This will required them to listen to what others have to say and to be willing to accept reasonable accommodations or alterations in their own views. As a result, the deliberations of the coalition will increase the rigor, coherence, and clarity of its programs.

The spirit of compromise among opposition groups is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the new coalition. Equally important is the removal of divisive issues from the coalition's agenda. Instead of trying to resolve a century's residue of hatred and grudges, can the opposition impose upon itself a strategic self-censorship, a cleverly formulated gag rule to shift attention away from areas of discord and toward areas of concord? Can they use what John Rawls calls "the method of avoidance" to leave selected topics un-discussed for what they consider their own advantage? By tying their tongues about the sensitive questions that divide them, the opposition can secure forms of cooperation and unity otherwise beyond their reach.

Sometimes important objectives can only be achieved so long as they are left unspoken. This is common practice in liberal democratic states where members of political parties, in order to present a united front, refrain from publicizing their internal conflicts, or where legislators refuse to officially discuss questions which, if placed under the control of electoral majorities, would be detrimental to the common good.

All opposition parties must demonstrate that they share a reasonable political conception of justice or a core morality with other Ethiopians. This core morality, based on basic tenets of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic traditions, is differently elaborated in the cultures of the various ethnic groups. But the core commonalties are the basis on which public discussion of fundamental political questions can proceed and be reasonably decided, not of course in all cases, but in most cases of constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. From that base, Ethiopians could develop social cooperation guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures that those cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct. This would be a major change from the socially coordinated activity of the past in which orders were issued by the Emperor, the Derg, the EPRDF, or some central authority.

By agreeing to cooperate and to accept certain liberal principles of justice as a way of operating, Ethiopians could fashion a workable alternative to the endless and destructive civil strife that has plagued them during the past quarter century. Central to such an alternative are the promotion of tolerance and understanding among ethnic groups and religions and a deep respect for everything that would constitute "otherness," a respect acquired from understanding the positive values in other cultures. In the same way that Ethiopians can inherit the pain and guilt of earlier generations, so too can they inherit understanding, civility, and grace in dealing with others.

The opposition can utilize its scarce resources more effectively if all groups dodge the irksome issues of unity or secession--at least for the time being. If they possess the talent and will, opposition leaders can then negotiate a settlement--a system of power sharing and mutual accommodation in the interest of all major factions. By cultivating the arts of omission, opposition leaders may liberate the deliberative sense of the community, the opinions the majority holds when it discusses matters in a consecutive, disciplined, fact-minded and thoughtful way. By postponing the discussion of its most divisive issues, the opposition might increase its capacity to solve the underlying problems when they can no longer be repressed--after a democratic government is established in Ethiopia.

It is the establishment of such a government that should be the overriding mission of the opposition. How to bring about such a change is the most salient and troublesome question facing those concerned with bringing democracy to Ethiopia. It is evident that a major part of the citizenry no longer consents to and indeed rejects the current political order. The Christian Science Monitor cites experts who suggest that Meles' "government has the backing of only 5 percent of the population." In these circumstances, political prudence alone, as well as a commitment to the principle of democracy and active promotion of democratization, demands that the donor nations not commend a regime whose legitimacy is in dispute but rather that they strive to establish conditions that allow better reasoning about the proper reconstruction of the political order. Thus, the immediate need for a national democratic coalition accepted as a legitimate voice of opposition and armed to bring pressure to bear on the donor nations to seek such peaceful change.

If it were the best of all possible worlds, this could be done by bringing together the government of Ethiopia and the opposition in structured discussions to create the climate for the restoration of conditions in which all parties can reason fairly and honestly about the proper reconstruction of the constitutional order so that the daunting tasks facing the government of Ethiopia can be pursued with the support of and according to the will of the Ethiopian people. But is a negotiated transition to democracy a possibility?

The stereotypical EPRDF member is seen as an obdurate, hard core Marxist-Leninist who would not budge a centimeter on maintaining sole governing power in the narrowly based, highly repressive regime. Is it possible, however, that within the government of the FDRE, there are forces that would enter into peaceful negotiation if that were seen as the most promising framework for the realization of their interests? Cracks in the facade of TPLF/EPRDF unyielding unity appeared in the responses of some members to secret economic deals between Meles and Isayas and to the fighting that erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Increasing numbers of Tigreans question the TPLF's divisive politics. They fully realize that Meles and Isaias have not brought peace to their countries nor have they won legitimacy in large sections of the population.

Would some of the current rulers opt for democratic compromise if faced with the alternative of an open, possibly violent, conflict and of a democratic solution, which requires compromise but provides security? Are there moderate members of the government sufficiently concerned about their private economic interests as to see virtue in negotiation? If such principals are absent or cannot act, then establishing a democratic government in Ethiopia may be possible only if the dictatorship is defeated by force. A peaceful route to change would be preferable, and a new truly national democratic coalition composed of the united opposition can pave the way.