HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN ETHIOPIA: 

           NEW LIGHT ON THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 

                     by

                      Theodore M. Vestal

                Professor of Political Science

                  Oklahoma State University

A paper presented at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the African

   Studies Association, Nashville, TN, 16-19 November 2000

Published in Pan-Ethiopia Forum, Ethiopia Policy Institute,

                           2000-2001

      Contemporary Ethiopia under the governance of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)came into being in 1991 with the assistance of the U.S. Department of State. The U.S.-brokered peace of that year bringing an end to the long-lived Ethiopian civil war and the entry of the EPRDF into Addis Ababa with America's blessing were vital first steps for the fledgling government. The alliance of the EPRDF and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) appeared to the United States at the time to be the best bet for bringing stability to the troubled Horn of Africa. Further, the United States doubtlessly assumed that new governments in Ethiopia and, eventually, Eritrea would be more likely to cooperate with the foreign policy objectives of a nation that aided their ascensions to rule and kept them in power. Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and Issayas Aferworki of Eritrea became the leaders of their respective countries with strong pats on the back from the U.S. State Department. American policy was rationalized for three principal reasons: 

1) the importance of Ethiopia in maintaining stability in the Horn, where a devastating civil war continued to rage in the Sudan and where Somalia, once Ethiopia's nemesis, was now little more than markings on a map; 2) Ethiopia's serving as a counter to Islamic fundamentalism and the sponsorship of international terrorism in the Sudan (combating "the growth of global transnational threats to [U.S.] national security"); and 3) Ethiopia's potential in being part of the global economy (accelerating Ethiopia's "full integration into the global economy by promoting trade and investment, economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, and conflict resolution").1

     The United States, using its considerable influence in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union and other financial institutions, upheld and under-girded the EPRDF government with diplomacy and economic aid. While doing this, the State Department was content to overlook deficits of democracy in the governance of Ethiopia. Some American officials argued that the United State should not push Meles to strengthen the democratization process, either because authoritarianism is what Ethiopia needs or because, as the U.S. Department of State maintains, the EPRDF has already put Ethiopia on the path toward democracy. But at best, the EPRDF has fostered a discontinuous evolution of "democracy." Following the brief honeymoon period after the fall of the Derg, it became clear that the new EPRDF-directed government had no intention of sharing political power. Rather, the EPRDF governed as if it were still an insurgent group. The EPRDF leadership viewed the conduct of domestic politics not as an exercise in compromise and consensus building among fellow citizens but as a model of warfare against enemies. The EPRDF used battlefield skills in leadership, discipline, and control of resources to divide and conquer political foes. Central to the plan of battle was the downplaying of nationalism and the fostering of social fragmentation by emphasizing divisions based on ethnicity.2 

    The ethnically divisive policies of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) have led to the escalation of ethnic tensions in the country. In particular, the Tigrean cadres who are veterans of the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) have played a central role in arousing hatred against, first, Amhara citizens, stigmatized as responsible for past inequalities in the country, and later, virtually all other ethnic groups. The government, dominated by the Tigrean based EPRDF, has exacerbated ethnic tensions to such a degree that ethnic separatism is now codified in the new constitution, which allows ethnically-designated regions the right to secede. The FDRE has been divided into administrative units called killils, ethnic enclaves based on exclusiveness. The killil system envelopes every sector of msociety in an ominous cloud of suspicion and insecurity. Due in large part to these divisive policies, Ethiopians now frequently regard each other as divided by ethnicity rather than as united by nationality. 

THE SLIPPERY SLOPE 

     Critics of the TGE and FDRE maintain that human rights abuses were and are rampant and that repressions of the EPRDF are on a scale the equivalent to those of the world's worst dictatorships. Evidence of such abuses has been provided by credible Ethiopian and international human rights organizations such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)3, Amnesty International4, and Human Rights Watch5. The Government has restricted free speech, free press, free association, and the right to assemble in groups. The FDRE's policy of ethnic federalism is causing distrust and dissension within the country, and the Government has reacted by engaging in a campaign of repression. One ethnic group, then another--the Amharas at one time, the Oromo at another, and most recently, the Southern Ethiopia Peoples--provide scapegoats on whom frustrated aggression may exhaust itself. Opposition political parties have been hounded, harassed, and persecuted. Many people perceived as enemies of the Government have been subjected to extrajudicial arrests, detentions, interrogations, physical beatings and torture, disappearances, and even murder.      The current government used to assert that the human rights situation under the EPRDF was a great improvement over the record of the Derg.6 Such a boast has been muted during the past three years as more evidence becomes available of the subtle human rights abuses of the EPRDF in comparison to the openly brutal repressions of the Derg. The Government of the FDRE is very concerned with its image in the international donor community, especially with the United States and the World Bank, and thus carries out its persecution of political opponents and others in a more secretive fashion. The hopes of leaders of the FDRE that outsiders would not find out about their widespread human rights abuses were shattered when international attention was focused on their treatment of Eritrean-Ethiopians (especially their deportation to Eritrea) during the border war of 1998-2000.7    By using the repression of individuals and groups to remain in power, the EPRDF placed itself on a slippery slope of human rights abuses. As more abuses were propagated, then government slid irresistibly into the depths of authoritarianism. 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS ABOUT ETHIOPIA 

     While this was happening, the U.S. State Department, in official publications, put the Ethiopian government in the best possible light, conveying the impression that the FDRE was committed to improving human rights and the democratization process. With their selective reporting and carefully crafted phrases, these publications were attacked as being of dubious authenticity in describing Ethiopian realities.      For instance, the U.S. Department of State's "Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions" (the Profile), a document heavily relied upon by U.S. Immigration Court judges, reports that (1) there is a new government, the FDRE, that replaced the TGE, and that (2) Ethiopia has been divided nto autonomous ethnic regions created by the central government to ease ethnic tensions, and that (3) members of the various ethnic groups can relocate to a region where they are protected by that region from the central government and where the central government cannot enter to persecute them.8

 These assumptions strike me as misleading.      For example, the Profile states that "the TGE handed over power to the elected government of the FDRE..." and makes it sound as though the FDRE is a "new" government. A more correct analysis would have stated that the FDRE is a continuation of the TGE that was established by the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which in turn was created by the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) which was spawned from the Marxist-Leninist League of Tigray. Few of the leaders who dominate the TPLF/EPRDF/TGE/FDRE have changed since the TPLF came into being in the 1970s. The goal of that leadership, from the start, has been to take control of Ethiopia and to remain in power.    One of the ways in which they have sought to achieve that goal is by creating a surrogate political party for virtually every major ethnic group in the country (e.g., Amhara National Democratic Movement [ANDM], Oromo People's Democratic Organization [OPDO], Southern Peoples' Democratic Front [SEPDF]). These surrogate parties act as part of the security apparatus of the central government in the various regions or ethnic homelands (i.e., the ANDM in Amhara, OPDO in Oromia, SEPDF in the Southern Peoples' Region).   The plight of ethnic Oromo who oppose the Government is indicative of the false assumption of the Profile that members of the various ethnic groups can relocate to a region where they are protected by that region from the central government and where the central government cannot enter to persecute them. The Oromia Support Group in Great Britain has received first hand reports directly from victims, their close relatives and eye-witnesses that reveal a clear pattern of human rights abuses throughout Ethiopia. Some of these accounts show how suspected supporters of opposition political groups are pursued and tracked down over many miles before being detained, disappeared, or killed. The role of local officials" in these violations and in the street killings of Oromo in Addis Ababa appears to be minimal.9

     According to the highest ranking Oromo defector from the EPRDF Central Committee, Hassen Ali, "the Regional Government of Oromia cannot stop the arbitrary arrests, torture, extrajudicial killings and disappearances, all purely politically motivated, of innocent people in the face of the ruling party's police and security forces." Adds Hassen, who also served as Vice President of the Oromia Region: "The government of Oromia is autonomous according to the Ethiopian Constitution, but the Federal Government and its soldiers interfere in all matters, big and small, in the day-to-day activities of the government of Oromia."10 The same is true in all of the nation's regions.      Political asylum hearings in the United States describe the predicament of members of other ethnic groups under suspicion by the Ethiopian Government and also bring into question the accuracy of the Profile.11 For example, Amhara citizens, under ethnic federalism, are expected to live in their killil in the Amhara Region. Because of the ethnic- specific policies of the FDRE controlling travel and labor,  it would be difficult for Amharas to permanently move to a  different region. According to the Profile, Amharas should be  protected from persecution from the central government by  residing in their autonomous ethnic region. Yet many Amharas  are harassed and arrested by uniformed national soldiers in  the Amhara killil. They and their families also are harassed  by local police of the rulers of the region, the ANDM, a  TPLF/EPRDF front party, who would be present anywhere in the  Amhara killil. Therefore, there is no place in Ethiopia where  an Amhara under suspicion by the Government could live safely  without the threat of persecution by either the central  Government or the ANDM of the killil. 

      In remote regions, such as the Oromia or Amhara killils,  government forces sometimes confront armed dissident groups  pressing for self democratic change. Village shakedowns by  security personnel followed armed encounters or were used to  preempt such engagements. As a result hundreds of civilians  have been held under the authority of the Oromo and Amhara  regional governments that suspected them of supporting armed  opposition groups. This particular category of detainees  faces the greatest risk of political killings, torture, and  harsh and inhumane treatment, mainly at the hands of rural  militiamen and other security forces that enforce law and  order in remote rural areas. The absence of effective  judicial oversight has meant that most of those suffering  abuse have had no recourse to legal remedy. Furthermore,  their plight frequently goes unreported because the work of  most rights monitoring groups is restricted, by the Government to Addis Ababa.12 A sufficient number of cases  have come to light, however, to form what Amnesty  International describes as "a pattern of widespread detention, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial  executions."13

      For eight years after the EPRDF came to power in 1991,  the annual country reports on human rights practices by the  U.S. State Department lauded the efforts of the Ethiopian  government in improving human rights. The veracity of the  annual country reports for Ethiopia from 1991 through 1998  was sharply criticized by observers familiar with  contemporary Ethiopia.14 According to the New York-based Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, the State Department's  reports were biased and misleading and created very different impressions of the regime in question, depending on the  strength of U.S. economic and strategic ties.15 The country  reports, although vetted in Foggy Bottom, are routinely  drafted by the Foreign Service Officer most recently posted  to an American embassy abroad. This procedure may account for the reports on Ethiopia frequently using verbatim or similar  rhetoric year after year. It is convenient for the new  officer to rely on what was written before.

      While half-truths and partial errors--if not flat out  mistakes--in the country reports on Ethiopia are numerous, a  few examples are indicative of the problems of probity they  contain. For instance, the Oromia Support Group, headed by  the respected British physician, Trevor Trueman, has recorded  2,560 extrajudicial killings and 824 disappearances in Ethiopia since 1992.16 The Working Group on Enforced or  Involuntary Disappearances of the United Nations Commission  on Human Rights lists over one hundred cases of disappearances in Ethiopia from 1992-1996.17 Nevertheless,  the U.S. State Department's 1997 Human Rights Report asserted  that "there were unconfirmed reports of extrajudicial  killings by government security forces, however, the very  high numbers claimed by human rights activists and ethnically based NGOs could not be substantiated."18 The fact that the  reports of killings and disappearances could not be  substantiated did not mean that they did not happen, but more  likely, that they had not been investigated by U.S. embassy  staff. The Human Rights Report also asserted that "there were  no confirmed reports, but numerous unsubstantiated reports of alleged disappearances" in Ethiopia. Yet the same report  also conceded that security forces arrested and held people  "incommunicado for several days or weeks." Thus the Human  Rights Report seemed to admit that disappearances did in fact  occur.   The atrocious prison conditions, the regularity of  detention in unofficial centers, and the brutality  experienced by detainees in these centers was similarly  glossed over in the Report. The Report claimed that only  7,000 were in detention and that none were political  prisoners although admitting that "federal and regional  authorities arrested and detained hundreds of persons without  charge or trial for activities allegedly in support of armed opposition groups." Political opposition groups, such as the  All Amhara Peoples Organization (AAPO) which the government would have difficulty proving is "armed" or advocates  iolence, maintain that many of the people detained are held  for political reasons. In 1998, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 10,980 Ethiopians were  in prison for political or national security reasons.19 The  discrepancy between figures in the State Department reports  from 1992 through 1998 and in material available from the  United Nations Human Rights Commission and reputable NGOs must be kept in mind when reviewing those documents.  

     So long as Ethiopia remained at peace with its neighbors, the FDRE received blessings in the publications of the U.S. Department of State. During the border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from May 1998 through June 2000,  however, the U.S. viewed the FDRE in a new perspective.  Whatever the cause of the conflict, Ethiopia did not end the  war as quickly nor in the fashion shaped by U.S. policy- makers. Frustrated by Ethiopia's intransigence in peace  negotiations with Eritrea, the United States put the FDRE on its disciplinary list and altered its tone in talking about  its erstwhile friend. Gone were words of praise about  "governments like Ethiopia's...  writing a new chapter in  African history"20--much less the FDRE being a new face of  Africa or a part of an African Renaissance. Also muted was  praise for Prime Minister Meles as an admirable new kind of  African leader. The United States scaled back its direct  financial aid to both Ethiopia and Eritrea due to the war and suspended its balance of payment support to Ethiopia. America  also froze the training of Ethiopian troops within the U.S.- led peacekeeping training program in the African Crisis  Response Initiative.

      According to Ethiopian historian Medhane Tadesse, the  change in U.S. policy was to keep Ethiopia in its proper pace under American domination.21 Professor Madhane posits  that part of U.S. post-cold war policy is to either build up  a sub-regional power or to avert the development of one.  Ethiopia developed into an independently-minded power in the  Horn, as demonstrated by its influence in Djibouti, its role  in Somali politics, and its relationship with Kenya and  Sudan. Medhane contends that "the Americans can accept that  Ethiopia is powerful in the sub-region, but they can't allow  Ethiopia to do things its own way." As a result, the United  States pushed for a border war peace that protected Eritrea  and lowered Ethiopia's prominence in the region. An aspect of  diminishing the FDRE's reputation was an abrupt discovery of  human rights abuses by the EPRDF and their exposure by the  State Department.

 NEW LIGHT ON THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

      As a result, the 1999 Country Report on Human Rights  Practices in Ethiopia, issued in February 2000, is a far more candid account of conditions and is less biased and  misleading than were the earlier reports.22 In its latest  report, State has stopped ignoring repression and abuses in  Ethiopia. The report admits that "the Government's human  rights record generally was poor;" that "some local officials  and members of the security forces committed human rights  abuses;" that "security forces committed a number of  extrajudicial killings;" that "security forces at times beat  and mistreated detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and  detained citizens;" that "prison conditions are poor, and  prolonged pretrial detention remains a problem;" that "the  Government infringes on citizen's privacy rights, and the law  regarding search warrants is widely ignored;" that "the  Government restricts freedom of the press and continued to  detain or imprison members of the press;" that "the Government limits freedom of association" and assembly; and  that "the Government restricted freedom of movement." 

      For the first time, there were openly reported examples  of disappearances, deaths in detention and other cruel,  inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment; denial of  fair public trials and other derogations of due process; a  lack of respect for basic civil liberties; inadequate prison  food; restriction of ICRC access to the Maikelawi Special  Investigation Centre and police stations in Addis Ababa; and the use of the Zeway military camp for the detention and  interrogation of OLF supporters.    The State Department document does not cite specific instances of government officials torturing detainees  suspected of supporting political opposition groups (although  that frequently is the norm in accounts of detainees in  political asylum cases in the U.S.), but reports of beating  and mistreatment were labeled "credible" for the first time. Electoral malpractice in the preparations for the May 2000  elections, were "credible" and the use of underage conscripts  for the army and local militia was reported for the first  time.

      Where and to whom human rights abuses were perpetrated  are described with specificity. The record of the Woyane as  equal opportunity oppressors of literally all ethnic groups,  regions of the country, organizations, and professions is  laid out in such detail that the effect is astounding for  those who have read the earlier reports. Although there are still assertions with which many observers of the Ethiopian  scene would disagree (e.g., disappearances remained  "unconfirmed;" the private press was "active and  flourishing"), the general tone of the chronicle is a vast  improvement in veracity. The report appears to burst the  bonds of restraint that for so long had kept the Ethiopian  summary mild and indulgent compared to many other country  reports Leaders of the TPLF were rumored to be furious at the  report, especially the introductory comment, "The  Government's human rights record generally was poor."23 One  can only speculate as to why the State Department awoke from  its doze and wrote with more frankness about the EPRDF  regime. One also can hope that the State Department will continue its frank appraisal of human rights violations and  correct those aspects of the 1999 report that obviously are  in error. But one thing is certain: the "slippery slope" of  human rights abuses begun by the FDRE has been put under new  and brighter illumination--and that is a good thing for the bona fides of the many people and organizations who, for the  past nine years, have been reporting atrocities that are egregious gross indecencies committed against Ethiopian men  and women by officials of their government.

    Notes

 1. See generally, Theodore M. Vestal, "U.S. Policy Toward the

   Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Living up to the

   Ideal," Ethiopian Register, May 2000, 18-23; also

   published in 1 Pan-Ethiopia Forum: 1-13 (December 1999).

2. Vestal, Ethiopia: A Post-Cold War African State (Westport,

   CT: Praeger, 1999), 45-54.

3. EHRCO, "15th Regular Report, The Human Rights Situation in

   Ethiopia," 16 December 1999, Ethiopian Register, December

   1999/January 2000. 36-42.

4. Amnesty International Country Report, "Ethiopia and

   Eritrea: Human Rights Issues in a Year of Armed Conflict,"

   (AI Index: AFR 04/003/99).

5. Human Rights Watch World Report 2000, "Federal Democratic

   Republic of Ethiopia, Human Rights Developments."

6. Comments by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, Washington, D.C.,

   20 October 1995; see Vestal, "Meles' Meeting with American

   Ethiopianists," Ethiopian Register, February 1996, 18-24.

7. See, e.g., Noah Novogrodsky, "Eritrea + Ethiopia," Yale

   Law Report, Summer 1999, 70-75; EHRCO, "Human Rights

   Violations Resulting from Eritrean Aggression," Special

   Report No. 22, 24 August 1998.

8. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human

   Rights and Labor, "Ethiopia--A Profile of Asylum Claims &

   Country Conditions, October 1995.

9. Trevor Trueman, "Human Rights Violations in Ethiopia,"

   Virtual Seminar on Indigenous and Minorities' Rights,

   University of St. Andrews, Scotland, 1-20 June 1998.

10. "Central Committee Member Spills the Beans, Vice

    President of OPDO, Hassen Aliu, Exposes Tyranny of

    Ethiopian Government," Sagalee Haaraa, May-July 1999, 1-

    3; "Former OPDO Vice President Says TPLF Tried to

    Assassinate Him," Ethiopian Register, September 1999, 13.

11. This section is informed by the author's presenting

    expert witness affidavits and testimony in political

    asylum cases of Ethiopians and Eritreans in the U.S. in

    1995-2000.

12. Human Rights Watch, "Human Rights Curtailed in Ethiopia,"

    9 December 1997.

13. Urgent Action, 18/98, Amnesty International, London, 21

    January 1998.

14. See, e.g., "Oromia Support Group, Human Rights Abuses in

    Ethiopia, Press Release, January/February 1998," No. 21,

    pp. 17-20; "U.S. Dept. of State Report on Human Rights in

    Ethiopia," Sagalee Haaraa, February-April 1999, 7-8.

15. "Critique: Review of the U.S. Department of State's

    Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," Lawyers

    Committee for Human Rights, New York, 1995, 1996, 1997.

16. See the running tally of "Human Rights Abuses by the

    Ethiopian Government Since 1992" updated bimonthly by the

    Oromia Support Group and published in its newsletter,

    Sagalee Haaraa.

17. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human

    Rights, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or

    Involuntary Disappearances, Ed/CN.4/1998/43, 12 January

    1998.

18. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Ethiopia

    Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997," U.S.

    Department of State, Washington, D.C., 30 January 1998.

19. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report,

    1 June 1998.

20. Madeleine Albright, "Departure Remarks," Addis Ababa,

    Ethiopia, 10 December 1997.

21. "Historian Medhane Tadesse: 'Axis of Confrontation is Now

    Between Ethiopia and United States'," Addis Tribune, 27

    August 2000.

22. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "1999

    Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Ethiopia," U.S.

    Department of State, Washington, D.C., 25 February 2000.

23. "U.S. State Department Waking Up to Ethiopia's Human

    Rights Situation," Sagalee Haaraa, July 2000, 9.